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Abstract: Common pool resource theory appears to assume that external author-
ities are responsible for initiating attempts to ‘decommonise’ common property 
regimes. An unusual decommonisation proposal put forward in the Highlands and 
Islands of Scotland in the 1960s questions this assumption; in this instance the 
decommonisation proposal was initiated by rightsholders in the common property 
regime. The proposal would have enabled rightsholders to purchase their arable 
fields, thus privatising them and removing them from the hybrid tenure system 
called crofting. A critical historical and contemporary survey of the political con-
texts surrounding this proposal discloses that the particular hybridity of the ‘croft-
ing commons’ is a result of a historical process of ‘domestic colonization’ within 
Britain, and that this tenure system exists within a deeply-sedimented structure of 
domination whose normative assumptions may have influenced the decision of 
the rightsholders to propose decommonisation in the first place.
Keywords: Colonization, crofting, decommonisation, imperialism, Leviathan, 
privatisation
Acknowledgements: An earlier version of this article was presented to the 
International Association for the Study of the Commons conference in Edmonton, 
Canada in 2015. I am grateful for the comments that I received there and for the 
useful criticisms and proposals made by three IJC reviewers.
1. Introduction
This article outlines a long historical process of ‘decommonisation’, the process 
by which a joint governance regime for a common pool resource loses its defining 
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characteristics of resource system excludability and resource unit subtractability 
(Ostrom 1990; Nayak and Berkes 2011, 132). In doing so, it draws attention to 
an apparently unusual moment in this historical process at which rightsholders 
in the common pool resource themselves appear to have initiated a call for its 
privatisation. Specifically, it outlines a proposal initiated in 1967 by rightsholders 
in land which had been made subject to the Crofting Acts created by the British 
Parliament in the late 19th century. These Acts established crofting tenure as the 
legal landholding system for a largely agriculturally based common pool resource 
in the Highlands and Islands of Scotland, although significant aspects of crofting 
tenure – including the name – were themselves 19th century impositions on an 
older indigenous landholding system. The rightsholders’ proposal in 1967 would 
have removed their land from the regulated crofting tenure system and given them 
private property rights over land.
In describing this proposal the article brings into question an assumption in 
common pool resource theory that decommonisation processes are externally 
sourced. It suggests that specific historical, political and cultural factors con-
tributed to the particular internal ‘privatisation’ proposal in Scotland. The article 
therefore aims to contribute to a body of literature that augments new institu-
tional theory’s insights on the design and governance of common pool resources 
by disclosing how contextual factors can influence developments within a com-
mon pool resource system (Johnston 2004; Haller 2010; Forsyth and Johnston 
2014). Drawing on work from political theory on the nature and power of the 
state it argues that common property regimes for common pool resources may 
exist within deeply sedimented structures of domination which not only influence 
the development and integrity of common property regimes and the viability of 
common pool resources, but also have the capability to impact on the self-under-
standing and worldviews of common pool resource members. In doing so it also 
raises questions about where the boundary lines of authority for common pool 
resources are situated between the claims of private rights, state sovereignty and 
common property regimes.
The article’s methodology draws on the approach of the Canadian political 
philosopher James Tully (Tully 2008a, 25–36) to make critical contemporary and 
historical surveys of the issue being investigated, in this case contestation over 
how land is used, occupied and governed in a part of Scotland that has been under-
going cultural change within an imperial context. This approach is employed in 
order to situate particular contestations over how commons are governed within 
the broader system of political relations existing at the time of contestation; and 
also to consider them diachronically, as a contest whose form in its own historical 
moment may already have been deeply influenced by a series of preceding his-
torical interactions over the same issue. A genealogical approach of this sort can 
help to trace the power of previous political interventions to act on a particular 
contested governance situation.
The article begins with a discussion of decommonisation. It then outlines the 
hybrid land governance structure established by the creation of crofting tenure in 
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the Highlands and Islands of Scotland in the late 19th century, before introducing 
the decommonisation proposal initiated by crofters in the 1960s. Next, the article 
places this proposal into a historical and political context of 200 years of interven-
tions in the indigenous tenure systems aimed at decommonisation. It draws atten-
tion to the fact that in the context of British imperialism the decommonisation of 
collectively used and managed land in the Highlands and Islands was considered 
a necessary ‘domestic colonisation’ inside the imperial ‘mother country’. On the 
basis of this historical account the article goes on to argue that the request by 
members of the crofting common property regime to deregulate themselves and 
take on private property rights was occurring within, and partially in response to, 
a long-standing structure of domination which over generations had limited the 
ability of rightsholders to think within and act upon the conceptual structure and 
cosmology by which indigenous governance regimes for common land had been 
maintained before the application of ‘domestic colonization’.
2. Decommonisation
Ostrom (1990) dubbed the two contradictory ideological prescriptions recom-
mended by critics of common property systems to resolve so-called ‘tragedies of 
the commons’ as ‘privatisation’ and ‘Leviathan’. ‘Privatisation’ is the belief that 
dividing a commons into a private property regime will bring order, stability and 
sustainability; ‘Leviathan’ the belief that order can be established only by mak-
ing people – in Garrett Hardin’s words – ‘responsible to a coercive force outside 
their individual psyches’.1 Usually this external coercive force takes the shape of 
the state. Ostrom observed that the state is, in fact, the key external agent for both 
‘Leviathan’ and ‘privatisation’ prescriptions as it is said to authorise reforms of 
the latter type. Her theory of the state in relation to common pool resources con-
siders it ‘an “external” leader’ and a fundamentally coercive power under the rule 
of those who have gained ‘a monopoly on the use of force’. This commits her to 
the view that in ‘Leviathan’ and ‘privatisation’ reforms ‘institutional change must 
come from the outside and be imposed on the individuals affected’ (ibid., 8–15, 
41, 222 [n.15]).
The view that reforms to privatise common pool resources or to put them 
under the control of the state are initiated by external agents appears to be gener-
ally accepted in commons’ scholarship and reforms of these kinds have recently 
been analysed as processes of ‘decommonisation’ by Nayak and Berkes (2011).
Here ‘commonisation’ is understood as a process through which a resource 
gets converted into a jointly used resource under commons institutions that 
deal with excludability and subtractability, and ‘decommonisation’ refers to 
a process through which a jointly used resource under commons institutions 
loses these essential characteristics (ibid., 133).
1
 It is arguable that the institutions of a common property regime constitute precisely such a force.
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Nayak and Berkes have shown how decommonisation processes in the Chilika 
Lagoon in India were initiated by the state Government of Odisha. In one instance 
the Government assumed direct control for an area that had previously been man-
aged in common by fishermen; in others it initiated processes that led to private 
companies and individuals taking over commonly managed resources. These 
examples also show the state as an external agent with ultimate responsibility 
for ‘privatisation’ reforms, and suggest that ‘privatisation’ policies may be part 
of, rather than distinct from, the idea that ‘Leviathan’ is ‘the only way’ (ibid., 
137–140; Ostrom 1990, 13, 14).
3. Hybridity and decommonisation in crofting tenure
The next section of this paper uses the concepts of ‘Leviathan’ and ‘privatisa-
tion’ to examine the history of externally-led reforms intended to decommon-
ise common pool resource governance in the Highlands and Islands of Scotland. 
However, it begins by outlining some features of the governance system estab-
lished in the late 19th century, and by drawing attention to the internally initiated 
‘privatisation’ proposal of the 1960s.
In 1886 the British Parliament passed the Crofters’ Holdings (Scotland) Act. 
This brought longstanding common property regimes for the management of indi-
vidually used arable land and commonly used pastoral grazings in the Highlands 
and Islands of Scotland within the remit of the Scottish legal system. It granted 
a series of rights to smallholding tenants there who became known in the Act as 
‘crofters’. Their rights included: the secure right to use and occupy (but not to 
own) their arable croft land and the right to pass it to a chosen successor within 
their family; the right to fair rents fixed by an impartial body; and the right to 
compensation for any improvements if they were removed from the croft. It also 
affirmed their right to a share in the township’s common grazings and to other 
ancilliary rights such as to seaweed for fertiliser, peat for fuel, heather for making 
rope, and to a ‘noust’ – a place on the shoreline to draw up a boat (MacCuish and 
Flyn 1990, 4–5, 40–43). A crofter was defined in the Act as a resident tenant who 
held land from year to year on an annual rent of less than £30. The Act offered 
no protection for ‘cottars’, a category which covered squatters, and also house-
holders with a garden but without arable or pasture ground and paying an annual 
rent of £6. The Act also offered no means by which this group could obtain land 
(Johnstone 1912, 96, 97; Hunter 1976, 163). This was a source of great disquiet 
and quickly led to a new consciousness of difference between landed and landless 
(Camshron 1932, 320–323). 
The 1886 Act followed civil unrest in the north against land removals, and an 
1883 Royal Commission to look into conditions in the Highlands and Islands. The 
Commission’s report had recommended as the basic and primary unit of croft-
ing governance ‘recognition of the Highland township as a distinct agricultural 
area or unit, endowing it at the same time with certain immunities and powers’ 
(Parliamentary Papers XXXVI 1884, 16–32). However, following rancorous 
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 parliamentary debate on the provisions of the Commission’s report, the 1886 
Act did not mention the term ‘township’. Instead, the legislation made individual 
crofts within a township the basic governance unit and granted rights to individual 
landholders [‘crofters’] on the basis of their croft holdings (Cameron 1996). It 
was a further 5 years before the common grazing became subject to regulation. 
Here, the unit of governance was the grazings used collectively by the sharehold-
ers of the township of which the grazings was part. Although the system has been 
subject to many alterations in the intervening 130 or so years, this basic gover-
nance division has endured.
Under the 1886 Act the croft – usually of arable or better quality land – in 
a township is held individually, with the individual crofter given secure rights2 
of access, withdrawal and management, as well as a substantial right of exclu-
sion, over the croft land. Originally, there was no right of alienation while the 
crofter was alive – they could only bequest the croft to a chosen family member 
in the event of the crofter’s death; however in 1911 they gained a limited right 
of alienation – to assign their holding to family member as a result of ‘being 
unable to work his (sic) holding through illness, old age or infirmity’ (Johnston 
1912, 134–135). Despite retaining nominal ownership of the land, the landlord’s 
rights over the croft were hugely circumscribed, with only limited rights of access 
and withdrawal – for instance to extract minerals, and some timber. The state, 
through a regulatory body called the Crofters Commission, could facilitate a right 
of alienation for the landlord by having authority to remove the crofter from their 
holding if the crofter failed to pay rent to the landlord or breached other statutory 
conditions of tenancy; the Commission could also allow a landlord to ‘resume’ 
a holding, or part thereof, and free it from crofting controls if the Commission 
took the view that the resumption was for good of the holding or the estate (ibid., 
70–72, 130–132). Additionally, in relation to property rights on individual crofts, 
some townships (called ‘open townships’) have a period of several months over 
the winter – from the crop harvest until the beginning of the following grow-
ing season – in which the township’s animals are allowed to graze freely among 
all the individual crofts, making the individual crofts a common pool resource 
among the township’s crofters for that period of the year – during this period 
access, withdrawal, management and exclusion rights become effectively collec-
tivised. Access and withdrawal rights from the township’s common grazings were 
held by the township’s crofters generally who were entitled to appoint a com-
mittee to design a set of regulations to manage the grazings. These regulations 
required approval by the regulator (ibid., 102–103; Brown 2003). The mix of 
private rights, common property rights and state control means that, in terms of 
commons scholarship, crofting tenure can be considered a hybrid property regime 
(Fennell 2011). The connection of common property with other property institu-
tions, sometimes including local ideas of private property and aspects of feudal 
2
 This section of the article draws on Schlager and Ostrom (1992) for analysing property as ‘bundles 
of rights’ in common pool resource situations.
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tenures, is also found in other areas such as the Swiss Alps and in African contexts 
(Netting 1981, 52; Haller 2010).3
A key moment in legal revisions to the hybridity of the crofting system took 
place in the 1960s when the Crofters Commission regulator sought ‘the conver-
sion of crofting tenure into owner-occupancy’, a proposal which, if enacted, would 
have replaced the regulated system with private property rights. The Commission 
argued that crofting’s specialised and complex legal system was an impediment 
to ‘the orderly development of the Highlands and Islands economy’ and there was 
an overwhelming case to ‘assimilate crofting into the ordinary legal structure of 
the country’. As is typical in the development of crofting legislation, the proposals 
were subject to intense contention. Criticism from crofters and their supporters 
meant that the owner-occupancy proposal was dropped. However, a less radical, 
but much disliked, proposal which gave each crofter a right to buy their croft if 
they wished was built into crofting law, further increasing its complexity (Crofters 
Commission 1969, 27, 28; Hunter 1991, 131–132, 137–148).
This ‘privatisation’ proposal is of interest for common pool resource theory 
because it had been developed from a suggestion that came originally from croft-
ers themselves. Therefore, it can be argued that it does not fit the idea that such 
proposals come from outside. The proposal emerged from an original request in 
1967 by the Federation of Crofters Unions – the overarching representative body 
for crofters at the time – for crofters to have a right to buy their croft in certain 
circumstances. The request was made in response to land being taken out of croft-
ing tenure in the 1950s and 1960s for use in tourism and industrial development 
projects associated with the British state’s wider post-World War Two productiv-
ist industrial agenda in the Highlands and Islands. In such cases the crofter was 
only entitled to the agricultural value of the land which was usually a pittance. 
The landlord, on the other hand, was entitled to the development value of the 
same ground, usually a much greater amount. When the Crofters Commission 
transformed this request into the proposal for mandatory owner-occupancy, it was 
initially supported unanimously by the Federation of Crofters Unions, and sub-
sequently caused strong disagreement between different local unions within the 
Federation (Stornoway Gazette 1967, 1; 1968, 1; Crofters Commission 1968, 8; 
Hunter 1991, 130–131). Examining the historical and political contexts in which 
crofting tenure developed may help us to form an understanding of why crofters 
would initiate and support a proposal which would have brought their resource 
governance system to an end.
4. ‘Domestic colonization’ and the beginnings of crofting tenure
Although crofting tenure is today associated with northern Scotland, as a form 
of land holding it is not indigenous to the area. The forms of tenure that pre-
ceded crofting are referred to in the historical record as ‘dùthchas’ in the Gaelic 
3
 I am grateful to an IJC reviewer for drawing my attention to these examples.
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language indigenous to those parts of the Highlands and Islands known as the 
Gàidhealtachd.4 Dùthchas was evidently a system of customary law or native 
title associated with traditional clan society and collective rights. The evidence 
suggests that this system operated within Gaelic society as a form of heritable 
trusteeship of land, largely on the basis of communal and familial land rights and 
management practices with both arable and pastoral land being held in common 
(Carmichael 1884; Macinnes 1996, 5, 14–24; Cregeen 2014, 123–141). Allan 
Macinnes has argued that the key figures in decision-making over resources and 
institutional design in clan society were the daoine uaisle, leading members of a 
clan who were often, but not always, related to the chief. Macinnes argues that by 
the 17th century the daoine uaisle often had the role of fir–tacsa. Practically, this 
meant that they were responsible for managing all aspects of the maintenance of 
a baile – ‘township’ – on clan territory on behalf of the clan, including ‘resource-
management, demand-management and man-management (sic)’. This entailed 
managing all natural resources in the township’s land, including any forest and 
shoreline as well as agricultural land. They were also responsible for appropriat-
ing and re-alloting land among members of the baile, ensuring the land was fer-
tilised and crops protected, organising extractive activities such as for lime, slates 
and freestone, and directing other major tasks such as fishing and transhumance 
(Macinnes 1996, 14–19).
Beyond its role in land governance, dùthchas is a key concept in Gaelic 
culture and is used to express a person’s sense of identity and belonging in inter-
related familial, territorial and historical concerns (MacInnes 2006, 279). The 
term ‘croft’ only became widespread in the Gàidhealtachd in the later eighteenth 
century, largely as a result of its introduction by Lowland surveyors redistribut-
ing land along ‘improved’ lines. However, ‘croft’ had already been in common 
use in England and Lowland Scotland in the medieval period (Homans 1975; 
Markus et al. 1995, 112–116). Moreover, the transition to a crofting system in 
the Gàidhealtachd was one that was generally opposed by those on whom it 
was being imposed. Indeed, by the late eighteenth century the area had already 
been subject to a long process of territorial, political and cultural marginali-
sation within Scotland that is now being described by historians as ‘internal 
 colonization’ (Goodare 2004; MacGregor 2006, 2012; MacCoinnich 2008; 
Cathcart 2010).
Crofting tenure appears to have emerged in the Gàidhealtachd following the 
Jacobite Rising of 1745 against the Hanoverian British monarchy. This rising 
4
 Although this article focusses on the historical experiences of Gaels belonging to the Gaelic cul-
ture of the west Highlands and Western Isles, it is important to note that crofting legislation brought 
together two culturally distinct sets of land rights; on the one hand of Gaelic society, and on the 
other, of the Nordic descended society in the north Highlands and Northern Isles of Orkney and 
Shetland, an area where there had also been complaints about land governance practices under com-
mercial landlordism. For this reason the term ‘Gàidhealtachd’ is generally preferred to ‘Highlands 
and Islands’ when describing the territory occupied by Gaels.
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was supported by many of the area’s clans. In the rising’s aftermath the British 
Government sought to ‘pacify’ and ‘civilise’ the area by introducing forms of 
agriculture and manufacturing more widely practiced in Lowland Scotland; this 
process was overseen by the Board for the Annexed Estates. Its work included 
introducing a new form of individualised relationship with land. One of the Board’s 
key policies was to establish what it called ‘colonies’ of former soldiers and sailors 
on annexed estates which the Government had seized from traditional clan lead-
ers who had supported the rising. These soldiers were to be given small individual 
plots of land from which they could maintain themselves. Recent analyses have 
argued that the introduction of these colonies marks the beginnings of crofting ten-
ure in the Gàidhealtachd. Although the work of the Board is generally considered 
to have been a failure, it has been argued that widespread attempts at ‘wasteland 
colonization’ made by private landlords in Scotland later in the 18th century took 
inspiration from the Board’s projects. Wasteland colonization involved settling 
groups of people (who had often been evicted from land elsewhere) onto unculti-
vated moor, heath or bog and giving them individual rights to ‘improve’ land that 
had previously been used in common (MacKillop 2000; Albritton Jonsson 2013).5
The individualisation of landholding patterns that wasteland colonization 
entailed was a practical implementation of the wider ideology of ‘improvement’ 
that prevailed at this time. One prominent proponent of wasteland colonization 
was the Scottish Enlightenment philosopher and legal scholar, Lord Kames, who 
had also been a member of the Board for the Annexed Estates. Kames’s student, 
Adam Smith, was perhaps the foremost theorist of ‘improvement’ and his book The 
Wealth of Nations published in 1776 outlined the rationale of and for ‘improve-
ment’ (Devine 2006). In the The Wealth of Nations Smith was greatly concerned 
with the late 18th century relationship between Britain and America and argued 
that Britain should relinquish its colonial possession across the ocean because the 
American colonies were a longstanding financial burden on the country (Smith 
1904, Vol IV.7.152). However, he acknowledged that Britain would not do this 
willingly and, emphasising the huge public debt that repeated wars in America 
had accrued for the nation, he offered other means to reduce the country’s debt 
burden. He argued that this would require either considerable reduction in public 
expense or ‘some very considerable augmentation of the public revenue’ (ibid, 
Vol V.3.67). It was for this reason that Smith recommended that Britain’s two 
main sources of revenue, land and capital stock, should be employed as efficiently 
as possible in order to service the debt burden. Smith’s underlying argument was 
that agricultural ‘improvement’ was necessary for the wealth of the nation and, 
moreover, that undertaking such work successfully would demonstrate the ‘skill, 
dexterity and judgment’ of the nation’s ‘improving’ class. Brian Bonnyman has 
suggested that Smith’s view that the ‘best way to improve the land was to break up 
large estates into smaller owner-occupied farms’ may have influenced the  leasing 
5
 There are interesting parallels between these colonization projects and British imperial land 
 policies in Ireland in the 19th century.
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policies of the Duke of Buccleuch, one of Scotland’s largest landlords, for whom 
Smith had been a childhood tutor (Bonnyman 2014, 69). Certainly, Smith’s gen-
eral ideas on ‘improvement’ profoundly influenced the development of British 
agriculture at this time (The Agricultural Magazine 1803, 390; Broglio 2010).
One of those influenced by Smith was Sir John Sinclair of Ulbster, a landlord 
in the northern Highlands. Sinclair was driving force and first chair of The Board 
of Agriculture and Internal Improvements set up by the British Government in 
1793, and is widely considered ‘the leading contemporary authority on rural 
Scotland in the 18th century’ (Devine 2006, 42). His massive two volume General 
Report of the Agricultural State and Political Circumstances of Scotland was writ-
ten, he said, to promote the ‘future improvement and prosperity of the country’. 
The report was a blueprint for agricultural improvement and its second chapter 
asserted that it sought to achieve internally what Britain had failed to achieve in 
America. The ‘improvement of the more northern parts of the kingdom’, stated 
the report, was ‘in other words…to colonize at home’ (Sinclair 1814a, 3, 120). 
Stating a view not dissimilar to Adam Smith’s on the best form of landholding for 
‘improvement’, the report extolled private property and excoriated alternatives:
The best constitution of property in land, to excite and encourage agricul-
tural improvements, would infer, that sole command and control over it, that 
excludes all obstruction to management, as also that absolute power of dis-
posal, which would secure to the industrious improver the full possession of 
the fruits of his application of labour and capital (Sinclair 1814b, 252–253).
Sinclair detested common property regimes. In a memoir his son noted: ‘It was in 
Caithness that my father first manifested that antipathy to waste lands, which so 
long characterised his exertions as President of the Board of Agriculture. Among 
his favourite toasts was, ‘May a common become an uncommon spectacle in 
Caithness’’ (Sinclair 1837, 349). He tried unsuccessfully to get Parliament to 
pass a General Enclosure Act. Sinclair’s sister was married to the second Lord 
MacDonald who held extensive estates on the islands of Skye and North Uist. The 
reform of Lord MacDonald’s estates at the outset of the nineteenth century gives 
an indication of how ‘improving’ ideas were put into practice on the land. The 
reforms were carried out by a surveyor called John Blackadder who produced two 
reports. Although Lord MacDonald had no intention of giving anyone else ‘sole 
command and control’ over parts of his estate, Blackadder’s proposals were in 
line with the recommendations in Sinclair’s General Report, proposing enclosure 
of what had been communally held lands into individual apportionments as far as 
was practically possible. However, in practice, as I describe in more detail later, 
what was enclosed was generally only the arable land of each township.
Blackadder recommended that all people who were until that point living on 
land jointly held ‘ought to be removed to allotments of a few Acres, less or more 
according to the quality of the soil, in the most eligible situations for that purpose, 
where such small possessions do not interfere with or mar the laying out of a 
‘Decommonising the mind’: historical impacts of British imperialism 287
 better farm’ (Blackadder 1800, 14). These ‘allotments’ or ‘small possessions’ later 
became generally known as ‘crofts’. Blackadder’s use of the word ‘mar’ discloses 
that profit from the new system was expected to come from the big new single-
occupier farms, created out of the old joint holdings, which were to be leased by 
‘Southern Overseers’. On many estates, including Lord MacDonald’s, the small 
tenants were to be retained on their ‘allotments’ or ‘crofts’ as a cheap and conve-
nient labour force for the – at that time – lucrative but highly arduous seaweed 
harvesting industry (Macinnes 1996, 223).
In 1811 Blackadder’s second report elaborated further on his intentions to 
‘allot out into small possessions the least profitable parts of the estate’. This he said 
was ‘strongly recommended, as by that means it will be more rapidly improven, 
and a greater number of people retained thereon’ (Blackadder 1811, 3). As in 
1799, Blackadder operated on the principle that his plans will ‘improve’ Lord 
Macdonald’s estates. The ‘improvements’ of which the surveyor writes emerge as 
three-fold and connected.
•	 The first of these is improvement of the land – his plans centered around 
the ‘arable and improvable parts of these farms’ (ibid., 2).
•	 Implicit in the improvements to the land is a second improvement: the 
need to ‘improve’ Lord MacDonald’s finances. This is key to the changes; 
in 1815 Armadale Castle was built for Lord MacDonald at a cost esti-
mated, in today’s prices, at around £13 million. Critically, for the develop-
ment of the crofting system’s pastoral commons, Blackadder concluded 
the hill grazings should not be enclosed and allotted because of the costs 
involved: ‘It must be understood that it is only the arable part of the farms 
that can be allotted out into separate possessions for however desirable it 
might have been to lay the grazings out in the same way, this cannot be 
done without greatly lessening the value thereof’ (ibid., 2).
•	 Thirdly, the surveyor predicts an influx of ‘substantial farmers and grazi-
ers so that by a proper adjustment of the Society the improvement and dig-
nity of the whole may go together’ (ibid., 3). Thus the third improvement, 
according to Blackadder, was to the character of the native population, 
under the influence of settlers from the ‘south’ (Blackadder 1800, 88).
As the second point, above, notes, in principle Blackadder wished to individualise 
all of the Clan Donald estate. However, due to economic considerations only the 
arable areas were individualised while the pasture remained common. Thus, the 
changes represented only a ‘quasi-privatisation’ of the indigenous system; in doing 
so it set a foundation for the hybridity of crofting tenure. The kind of redistribu-
tion I have described on Clan Donald land took place on estates throughout the 
Gàidhealtachd during this period (Macinnes 1996; Hunter 2000; Cregeen 2014). 
For instance, Sir John Sinclair carried out similar reforms on his own estates, 
describing the new settlement pattern of large farms and smallholding townships 
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as ‘new colonies’, part of a larger grand project of the ‘domestic colonization’ of 
Scotland (MacKinnon 2017, 31–32). These changes were predicated on a shift in 
the perceptions of the clan elite as to their relationships with traditional lands and 
people. According to historian Allan Macinnes, ‘they abandoned traditional con-
cepts of heritable trusteeship, their dùthchas, in favour of the legalistic concept 
of heritable title, their oighreachd, to enhance their assimilation into the Anglo-
Scottish landed classes’ (Macinnes 1996, 233).
The land redistributions required as part of the new order were often carried 
out on Gaels by non-Gaels and accompanied by attitudes of cultural and racial 
superiority typical of colonial relations – the natives were said to be ‘lazy’, ‘filthy’ 
or ‘savages’ (Osterhammel 2005, 108–110; MacKinnon 2017, 33–38). These 
redistributions included their removal from land, their relocation on marginal 
land, their migration (often forced) away from their traditional areas to new lands 
in Britain or overseas. Although historians argue over the costs and benefits of the 
new arrangements, they were associated in popular consciousness with material 
and cultural impoverishment. Native resistance – in particular to the removal of 
common grazings’ rights – occurred sporadically throughout the 19th century. 
However, the unrest came to a peak in the 1880s when techniques of resistance 
included rent strikes, destruction of landlord property and violent confrontations 
with a range of law officers. This resistance received widespread press coverage 
and provoked the repeated deployment of Royal Marines in the north west to 
try to suppress the unrest. The situation led the British Government to establish 
the aforementioned Royal Commission of 1883, and subsequently to the Crofters 
Holdings (Scotland) Act of 1886 (MacPhail 1989; Meek 1995).
In summary, the British imperial state gradually increased its political con-
trol over the Gàidhealtachd during the course of the 18th and 19th centuries. As 
a result of and in response to this increased control three significant and related 
movements can be identified in the transition of land governance away from the 
variety of communal indigenous dùthchas systems towards crofting as a single 
hybrid system of tenure:
•	 Firstly, the imperial state’s efforts to ‘pacify’ and ‘civilise’ the area follow-
ing the uprising in 1745; this process of ‘Leviathan’ included establishing 
‘colonies’ of retired soldiers with small ‘privatised’ holdings on lands pre-
viously held collectively;
•	 Secondly, the gradual imposition of commercialisation and individualism 
inherent in improvement ideologies of late 18th and 19th century Lowland 
Scottish society onto dùthchas systems, and subsequent indigenous resist-
ance to the ‘privatisation’ of their traditional lands;
•	 Thirdly, the Crofters Act of 1886, a late 19th century breaching of the 
‘Leviathan’ of the British state into the disordered governance of land and 
natural resources in the Gàidhealtachd – a disorder substantially created 
by the externally led reforms and indigenous resistance to them.
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5. The political context of the internal decommonisation proposal
Derek Flyn, a crofting lawyer and former chair of the current crofting representa-
tive body, recently described the law that underpins crofting tenure as ‘the law of 
a different land’ (Flyn 2012, 418). The scale of the difference can be discerned in 
attempts to bring crofting tenure further into line with wider landholding norms in 
British society occurred throughout the 20th century. An attitude common to the 
authorities responsible for these attempts can be discerned in the report of a 1928 
UK Parliamentary Committee on land resettlement in the Highlands and Islands:
The problem in the Highlands involves historical, racial, economic and social 
considerations entirely different from those in other parts of Great Britain. 
We are dealing with a community which has never been industrialised and 
resists any attempt at industrialisation. Land is the basis of its existence and 
determines the forms of its social life. It has refused to acquiesce in any of the 
attempts to change the method of holding or using land which have been made 
in the last 150 years, and the legislature has been compelled to meet the claims 
it has made to be allowed to live its life in its own way (RCLSS 1928, 25).
Externally initiated attempts to change the methods of holding and using land in 
the Gàidhealtachd based on principles of ‘privatisation’ and ‘Leviathan’ contin-
ued throughout the second half of the 20th century.6 Following the Second World 
War, food scarcities in Europe encouraged politicians in many countries, includ-
ing the UK, to create policies encouraging agricultural modernisation – inten-
sifying and specialising agricultural production and concentrating agricultural 
resources in fewer hands – in order to maximise the production of food and fibre 
(van Leeuwen 2010, 18). When productivist policies began to be implemented 
in UK agriculture in the immediate post-war years, senior Scottish political fig-
ures highlighted ‘the failure of the crofting localities to contribute properly to 
the national food production effort’. The Government set up a new Committee 
of Inquiry whose remit included special reference to ‘the secure establishment 
of a smallholding population making full use of agricultural resources and deriv-
ing the maximum benefit therefrom’. The Committee of Inquiry report in 1954 
proposed creating a new Crofters Commission to regulate and develop crofting. 
Subsequent Government policy briefings made clear this meant a focus on agri-
cultural development (Hunter 1991, 78–79, 91).
The Government accepted the Committee of Inquiry’s proposal and a new 
Commission was set up as part of new crofting legislation in 1955. It immediately 
advocated a productivist agenda, calling on ‘crofters to increase their agricultural 
output by 5% annually between 1956 and 1959’. A key development policy was 
township reorganisation with a central tenet being to enlarge and amalgamate hold-
ings in order to make more crofters into full-time agricultural specialists. After 
6
 The following analysis is indebted to James Hunter’s valuable history of 20th century crofting 
(Hunter 1991).
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initial attempts to this end failed, the Commission called for draconian additional 
powers for the ‘compulsory reorganisation’ of townships so that it could forcibly 
amalgamate or impose sub-tenants upon crofts it considered underused or unused. 
Crofters expressed alarm at the Commission’s view that crofting tenure was ‘out-
dated’ and at its proposal to undertake ‘a drastic reduction in the number of crofter 
houses’. A leader of the crofting union for the Western Isles, one of the strongest 
crofting localities, complained that the Commission was seeking a narrow bureau-
cratic solution to a much more complex economic problem, as part of which the 
young men of many crofting townships had to leave their communities to find work. 
The Commission was condemned in parliament for attempting to ‘humiliate and 
discipline’ crofters trying to make a living in very difficult circumstances (Macleod 
[No date given]; Hunter 1991, 82, 103, 106–118, 122). Thus, the direct ‘Leviathan’ 
approach was largely repelled with the more draconian proposals dropped from 
legislation passed in 1961 but with a residue built into crofting law, further increas-
ing its complexity. The response of the head of the Commission to the impasse was 
to describe crofting legislation as ‘a ghastly error’ (Scotsman 1960).
Therefore we can see that the proposal made by some crofters in 1967 to estab-
lish private property rights in the regulated tenure system took place in a political 
context where crofters were being criticised by productivist improvers for a lack 
of economic activity (what previous generations of improvers had called ‘lazi-
ness’) and being urged into a productivist agenda by agricultural and land tenure 
policy; equally, crofters were having to come to terms with the arrival of mass 
tourism and of large-scale industrial projects new to the area, such as the pulp mill 
in Lochaber and the experimental nuclear energy facility in Caithness – both now 
defunct – which were, at one and the same time, being extolled in socio-economic 
terms while, directly or indirectly, taking land away from crofting.
In response to this situation the Federation of Crofters Unions proposed that 
in certain circumstances a crofter should be entitled to buy their land as a way 
of dealing with the perceived inequality between crofter and landlord when both 
were being compensated for land removed from crofting tenure. The Government 
then turned this proposal into a far more complete and final measure to bring 
crofting tenure to an end. Although in one sense it could be argued that there 
was an external ‘Leviathan’ leading the process, this argument does not deal with 
the fact that the initial proposal for ‘privatisation’ – albeit a modest and partial 
one – came from the rightsholders themselves. The internal origin of this reform 
proposal appears to challenge the assumption that ‘privatisation’ or ‘Leviathan’ 
reforms of common pool resources come from external sources and therefore 
originate outside of the rightsholders (Ostrom 1990, 13–14).
Moreover, the coercive land redistribution proposals and socio-economic 
disparagement of the 1950s and 1960s must also be understood in the context 
of at least 200 years (and arguably far longer) of ‘Leviathan’ and ‘privatisation’ 
policies for land tenure change in the Gàidhealtachd. These policies were accom-
panied by discriminatory attitudes from those imposing the policies towards 
those on whom the policies were being imposed. This historical process not only 
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 created the identity of ‘crofter’ for members of the indigenous population, it may 
also have had other consequences for Gaels’ self-understanding. The next section 
argues that the internally led ‘privatisation’ request may have been influenced by 
a deeply-sedimented structure of domination which over generations had changed 
the conceptual structures and cultural norms within which members of the com-
mon property regime had maintained their common pool resources before the 
imposition of ‘domestic colonization’.7
The theory of the state employed by Ostrom describes it as a fundamen-
tally coercive power with the authority to initiate ‘Leviathan’ and ‘privatisation’ 
policies for common pool resources. This depiction accords with Max Weber’s 
classic description of the state as ‘a compulsory association’ which ‘has been 
successful in seeking to monopolise the legitimate use of force as a means of 
domination within a territory’ (Weber 2005, 82–83). Drawing on Weber’s work, 
Michel Foucault described a structure of domination as ‘a strategic situation more 
or less taken for granted and consolidated by means of a long-term confronta-
tion between adversaries’ (Foucault 1983, 226). Foucault’s perspective can draw 
attention to the fact that the imposing power of the state is often an underlying 
and more or less taken for granted a-priori in particular political conflicts within 
the state. This is because while ‘the state is only one source of authority within 
society’ (Johnson and Forsyth 2002, 1592), its claim to authority within society 
7
 I am grateful to an IJC reviewer who suggested that an analysis drawn from economic and political 
new institutionalism in social anthropology and anthropological ecology (Ensminger 1992; Haller 
2013) can be used to emphasise the agency of crofters and the ways in which they seek to maximise 
their ‘bargaining power’ in this sort of resource dilemma. An institutional ecology analysis can draw 
out questions of when and how ‘counter-discourses and narratives are used (efficiency and modernity 
vs highland way of subsistence driven life and tradition)’ by different actors, and can also seek to 
understand the behaviour of elites and others in terms of a strategic hybridity – elites can be construed 
as seeking ‘to be modern or traditional at the same time to fit the needs of the political discourse’. 
Using this perspective, the reviewer pointed out that it may be possible to conceive of crofters as 
acting strategically in their context and within the range of options at hand, ‘making use of dominant 
institutional settings – privatisation – and ideologies’ in ways that are logical and selective in order 
to achieve the strategic goal of securing land and avoiding the worst case scenario of losing the land. 
Notwithstanding the fact that an institutional ecology approach may help to elucidate the reasoning 
adopted by those crofters who initiated and supported the ‘privatisation’ proposal, the argument pro-
posed in this article is that the very act of making such a proposal may demonstrate a strategic ability 
of elite organisations to achieve ontological change in non-dominant actors. The argument is that the 
authoritative statements of elite organisations may have a cumulative discursive power to constrain 
and even alter the conceptual norms, and the forms of reasoning and argument, employed by those 
non-dominant groups, even when those groups are opposing elite organisation policies. Indeed, the 
adoption by some crofters of the dominant forms of reasoning and argument may be considered a 
form of ‘elite capture’ which draws those non-dominant antagonists into the ambit of the ideological 
conventions of the dominant institutional setting, thus making possible the articulation of ‘privatisa-
tion’ proposals by members of the non-dominant group. In the context being examined, the sense 
that some form of normative conceptual change is occurring gains strength from the fact that, as will 
be shown, simultaneous to the non-dominant group’s adoption of a ‘privatisation’ strategy, it also 
appeared to be losing its ability to articulate one key normative concept, that of dùthchas, by which 
its institutional difference had been maintained.
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is special as it claims to be the force that constellates a society within a particular 
territory8 by virtue of its sovereign status and enduring nature. Quentin Skinner 
describes the state as ‘a fictional or moral person distinct from both rulers and 
ruled…While sovereigns come and go…the person of the state endures, incurring 
obligations and enforcing rights far beyond the lifetime of any of its subjects’ 
(Skinner 2009, 37, 45).
As in the contention between different societal factions over whether the 
‘township’ should be the primary unit of land governance in the run-up to the 
1886 Crofters Act, power struggles within society are mediated through institu-
tions of the state and decided there too. In countries where the state is weak the 
power of the state might be drawn on ideologically – invoked by political actors 
as a discursive or rhetorical strategy – rather than through the state’s practical 
ability to enforce policies through means of its systems of law (Chabwela and 
Haller 2010, 631). Johnson and Forsyth (2002, 1594) argue that any ‘intervention 
by the state, then, can be seen as an attempt to align the informal institutions of 
society with the formal institutions of a particular government goal or policy’. 
However even these government goals and policies exist within and have been 
created out of a set of historically rooted societal norms that have made these 
goals and policies possible. In this sense the state cannot be considered so much 
the primary actor of political struggle, as instead, the site and shaping context in 
which political struggle proceeds; this requires a distinction between the ‘state’ 
and the ‘government’ which rules that state at any particular moment.
The role of the state in maintaining a domination structure is called into ques-
tion by James Tully and Neil Walker’s work considering some of the general 
features common to ways in which domination has been structured during both 
the formal colonial period of imperialism, and also during what they call contem-
porary informal imperialism. The formal period of European colonial empires 
overseas was brought to an end by the United Nations’ legislation on decoloniza-
tion in the late 1950s. However, it has been widely observed that the structural 
inequalities typical of formal imperial rule have not passed with decolonization. 
Indeed, Tully has gone so far as to claim that the typical forms of state based 
representative democracy are the means by which informal imperialism operates 
in the post-colonial world today (Tully 2008b, 158). The governance of crofting 
tenure suggests that this argument may be extended beyond those countries that 
were subject to the UN-led decolonization processes of the 1950s.
Of the general features of domination laid out by Tully and Walker, the first 
is that the structure of domination maintains ‘cumulative inequality’ by operat-
ing in a mutually reinforcing fashion over various sectors and through the use 
of a range of mechanisms of control and persuasion, including education and 
culture. Walker argues that the imperial framework is ‘a system whose operation 
is optimised to the extent that all social relations are subsumed within its logic 
8
 The successful enforcement of this claim is perhaps also implicated in the idea that we can think of 
a one-to-one relation between ‘state and society’.
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and is threatened to the extent that certain social relations may escape its logic’, 
adding that it ‘purports to embrace everything within its own horizon’ (Walker 
2008). From this perspective, imperial interventions in culture and education can 
be seen as means of creating, legitimising and channeling the norms and terms by 
which discourse unfolds, and in doing so seeking to subsume or maintain social 
relations within the logic and practice of the structure of domination. This makes 
the structure of domination more than simply a means of constraining legitimate 
political action.  To the extent that it achieves control of discourse, the structure is 
also a pervasive and unseen constraint on the ability to think – channeling flows 
of discourse in ways that generate and maintain a socio-cognitive environment in 
which certain thoughts become or remain unthinkable (Tully 2008a, 31–36).
My argument is that if the state is considered in these deeply coercive terms 
as the means by which forms of domination are structured within a territory, then 
to the extent that the state has control over the legislative – and therefore ‘legit-
imate’ – forms by which political struggles unfold within that territory it also 
has the ability to dictate the normative terms and concepts by which political 
struggles proceed. Under the constant pressure of this aspect of domination the 
terms and conceptual space in which those subjected to domination are able to 
think and express themselves may be infiltrated and reformed along the lines of 
the structural norm. Because, therefore, the social and self-understandings – the 
subjectivity – of those subject to this cognitive domination have been infiltrated, 
it is possible that in some cases even their resistances to domination will reflect 
the interference.9
 It is for this reason, I think, that Walker describes this aspect of 
domination as ‘mutually reinforcing’.
This perspective on the role and function of the state as an important com-
ponent in structures for organising and maintaining forms of domination affords 
us a critical purchase on struggles for the commons. We are able to see that any 
common pool resource system which exists within the territory of a state, and 
whose rightsholders are subject to the authority of that state, is already locked 
into a deeply sedimented system for domination that seeks to govern, not only 
the political responses of those who participate in common pool resource systems 
under the state’s jurisdiction, but also the socio-cognitive environment contain-
ing the historically shaped and limited concepts by which rights and obligations 
are enabled – contextual norms which extend beyond the lifetime of any of its 
9
 The argument put forward here on the ability of a dominant political agency within a structure of 
domination to infiltrate the normative belief systems of non-dominant groups is much indebted to 
Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong’o’s ‘Decolonizing the Mind’ (1986) which described the effects of British impe-
rialism on indigenous cultures in colonial Kenya. The argument is also not unrelated to the one 
proposed in Argrawal (2005) although there are questions about the historical basis of Agrawal’s 
analysis. Agrawal’s argument has been usefully critiqued by Acciaioli (2008), Cepek (2011), and 
Forsyth and Walker (2014). However, the assumption in some criticism that Foucauldian models 
leave ‘little room for the exercise of agency’ among those subject to unequal power relations is called 
into question by, for instance, James Tully’s use of Foucault’s work in service of a socially engaged 
form of public philosophy (Tully 2008a, 71–131).
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 subjects, and which make it possible for the subjugated rightsholders to respond 
in a political way in the first place.
I will illustrate this claim using as an example the transition from thinking in 
terms of dùthchas to thinking in terms of ‘crofting’ as a change in the orienting 
forces of Gaelic consciousness during the land struggle. Following the Crofting 
Act of 1886 the relevant UK legal and political authorities described the Act as 
an effort to protect what they called the old ‘clannish tenure’ of dùthchas; indeed, 
dùthchas had been invoked as the basis for a rights claim during the unrest that 
preceded the Act (Crofters Commission 1902, lxxxvii, lxxxviii; Newton 2009, 
306–308, 353–356). But any such restoration was, at best, partial because, while 
it recognised (under the terms of the subsequent 1891 legislation) collective rights 
of use and withdrawal, it neither recollectivised the arable land which had been at 
least semi-privatised as part of the early 19th century reforms of the ‘improvers’, 
nor recognised the traditional claim of the people’s collective rights over land 
and its governance. As communities of Gaelic speaking crofters continued, in the 
early 20th century, to agitate for more land to be returned to them, the ‘restoration 
of dùthchas’ narrative in state discourse quickly disappeared, to be replaced by the 
notion – as we have seen – that crofting was a still unresolved ‘problem’.
The proposal by the Federation of Crofters Unions to create a right to fully 
‘privatise’ croft land was therefore not taking place in a political vacuum but in 
response and as a contribution to a deeply sedimented structure of domination – 
involving, as the UK Parliamentary Committee on land settlement put it, ‘histori-
cal, racial, economic and social considerations’ – under which had been buried 
indigenous understandings of the rights and authority of the people in relation to 
the land. The infiltration of the terminology, concepts and attitudes of the domina-
tion structure into the self-understanding of Gaelic society can be demonstrated 
by the general self-definition of rightsholders in the 1960s as ‘crofters’, to a far 
greater degree than had been the case in the years before the Crofting Act of 1886. 
Relatedly, while some historians have speculated that the concept of dùthchas was 
important in land actions into the 20th century, there is little evidence that crofters 
invoked a right of dùthchas to support their political actions in relation to land 
in the 1950s and 1960s10
 (Robertson 2013; Houston 2014). Unlike the risings in 
the 1880s, there does not appear to have been a great deal of poetry produced in 
regard to land raiding in the mid-20th century, or in response to other land issues. 
Although the word dùthchas is used by some poets of the period, it is used in a 
more subjective sense of ancestral belonging or identity rather than in a political 
10
 However, it is important to note that when the last recorded land raid in Scotland was carried out, 
on North Uist in 1952, the editor of The Clarion, the local newspaper on Skye, Alexander Nicolson, 
a native Gaelic speaker, published a telegram he had sent to the raiders proclaiming: ‘NO MORE 
CLEARANCES. CLAIM YOUR HERITAGE. MEN OF UIST, THE CLARION OF SKYE IS AT 
YOUR COMMAND. HOLD FAST. EDITOR’. It is possible that ‘heritage’ here carried a meaning 
for Nicolson that was close or equivalent to that of ‘dùthchas’ as ‘heritable trusteeship’ (No Author 
Given 1952, 14; Macinnes 1996, 5; Macdonald and Maclean 2014, 443).
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sense as a rights claim (Maclean 1999, 252, 292; MacDhòmhnaill 1998, 198, 222; 
Black 2012). The foregoing emphasises that dùthchas continued to be invoked in 
Gaelic poetic discourse on identity throughout the 20th century, and claims for 
land were still being made on the basis of what could be considered the people’s 
inalienable right to land – what appears to have changed between 1880 and 1960 
is that it became impossible for Gaels to invoke the term dùthchas in a political 
way as a basis for land claims.11
6. Conclusion
This article has suggested that to assume decommonisation is an externally 
derived process may cause commons’ scholars to overlook aspects of historical 
and political context which can influence institutional change in common prop-
erty regimes. It has argued that many common property regimes for common 
pool resources exist within a deeply-sedimented structure of domination which 
has influenced the development and integrity of common property regimes and 
the viability of common pool resources. A historical survey of the enduring con-
flict over how commons in the Gàidhealtachd should be governed discloses that 
underlying the unusual internal ‘privatisation’ proposal of 1967 there is an archae-
ology. The proposal must be understood in relation to earlier political struggles 
against external intervention. This perspective makes it possible to understand why 
rightsholders – whose own social understanding and self-understanding had been 
subjected to socialisation in the wider norms of the domination system – might 
come to propose a modest ‘privatisation’ reform which was then transformed by 
‘Leviathan’ into an attempt to bring the tenure system to an end.
Ostrom (2009) noted that ‘The colonial powers in Africa, Asia, and Latin 
America, for example, did not recognise local resource institutions that had been 
developed over centuries and imposed their own rules, which frequently led to 
overuse if not destruction’, a conclusion which has been developed by Haller 
(2010) in their case study of colonial and post-colonial Zambia. A constant 
thread in the historical manifestations of ‘privatisation’ and ‘Leviathan’ reforms 
in the Gàidhealtachd has been the efforts of external agencies to impose inno-
vative forms of governance and control on an unwilling indigenous majority. 
This majority population, in response, has organised itself to employ a variety of 
means of resistance as part of an on-going struggle for the freedom to be able to 
think and act differently (Tully 2008a, 144). It seems reasonable to suppose that 
Scottish domestic colonization and informal imperialism –  both before and since 
the creation of specific crofting legislation in 1886 – may be implicated in the 
ways in which historical contestations over the governance of common land have 
unfolded in the Gàidhealtachd of Scotland. Indeed, some contemporary crofting 
commentators have drawn attention to what they feel are ‘colonial’ aspects of 
11
 McQuillan (2003, 51) has observed a similar trend towards subjectivity in the meaning of dúth-
chas in the closely related Irish Gaelic language.
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tenure governance today (WHFP 2008, 2010; Wilson 2007, 2012; Hunter 2010), 
and so one potential line for future research could be to investigate the present-
day politics of crofting by way of political theories on informal imperialism and 
neocolonialism.
Literature cited
Acciaioli, G. 2008. Environmentality Reconsidered: Indigenous To Lindu 
Conservation Strategies and the Reclaiming of the Commons in Central 
Sulawesi, Indonesia’. In People, Protected Areas and Global Change, eds. M. 
Galvin and T. Haller, 401–430. Switzerland: NCCR North-South.
Agrawal, A. 2005. Environmentality: Community, Intimate Government, and the 
Making of Environmental Subjects in Kumaon, India. Current Anthropology 
46(2):161–190.
Albritton Jonsson, F. 2013. Enlightenment’s Frontier: The Scottish Highlands and 
the Origins of Environmentalism. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Black, R. (ed.). 2012. An Tuil. Anthology of 20th century Scottish Gaelic verse. 
Edinburgh: Polygon.
Blackadder, J. 1800. Survey and Valuation of Lord MacDonald’s Estate 1800. 
Bosville-Macdonald Family Papers DDBM/27/3, Brynmor Jones Library, 
University of Hull. [The page numbers I am using are taken from a typescript 
copy of the survey and valuation held at the Museum of the Isles library at the 
Clan Donald Centre at Armadale on the Isle of Skye.]
Blackadder, J. 1811. Report relating to the value and division of Lord Madonald’s 
Estate in Skye made out by Mr John Blackadder the 24th Day of December 1811. 
MacDonald Estate Papers GD 221. 5912.
Bonnyman, B. 2014. The Third Duke of Buccleuch and Adam Smith: Estate 
Management and Improvement in Enlightenment Scotland. Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press.
Broglio, R. 2010. The Best Machine for Converting Herbage into Money: Romantic 
Cattle Culture. In Consuming Culture in the Long Nineteenth Century, eds. T. S. 
Wagner and N. Hassan, 35–48. Lanham: Lexington Books.
Brown, K. M. 2003. New Challenges for Old Commons: The Implications of 
Rural Change for Crofting Common Grazings. In Landscape, Law & Justice: 
Proceedings from a Workshop on Old and New Commons, Centre for Advanced 
Study, Oslo, 11–13 March 2003, eds. E. Berge and L. Carlsson, 143–166. 
Trondheim: Department of Sociology and Political Science, Norwegian 
University of Science and Technology.
Cameron, E. 1996. Land for the People? The British Government and the Scottish 
Highlands, c. 1880–1925 – Scottish Historical Review Monograph. East 
Lothian: Tuckwell Press.
Camshron, E. (ed.). 1932. Na Baird Thirisdeach. Stirling: The Tiree Association.
Carmichael, A. 1884. Grazing and Agrestic Customs of the Outer Hebrides. 
Edinburgh: Neill and Co.
‘Decommonising the mind’: historical impacts of British imperialism 297
Cathcart, A. 2010. The Statutes of Iona: The Archipelagic Context. Journal of 
British Studies 49(1):4–27.
Cepek, M. 2011. Foucault in the Forest: Questioning Environmentality in 
Amazonia. American Ethnologist 38(3):501–515.
Chabwela, H. N. and T. Haller. 2010. Governance Issues, Potentials and Failures 
of Participatory Collective Action in the Kafue Flats, Zambia. International 
Journal of the Commons 4(2):621–642.
Cregeen, E. 2014. Recollections of an Argyll-shire Drover and other West 
Highland Chronicles, ed. M. Bennett. Ochtertyre: Gracenote Publications.
Crofters Commission. 1902. Report to the Secretary of State for Scotland by 
the Crofters Commission on the Social Conditions of the people of Lewis as 
Compared with Twenty Years Ago. Her Majesty’s Stationery Office.
Crofters Commission. 1968. Report of the Crofters Commission for the Year 1967. 
Inverness: Crofters Commission.
Crofters Commission. 1969. Report of the Crofters Commission for the Year 1968. 
Inverness: Crofters Commission.
Devine, T. 2006. Clearance and Improvement: Land, Power and People in 
Scotland 1700–1900. Edinburgh: John Donald.
Ensminger, J. 1992. Making a Market: The Institutional Transformation of an 
African Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fennell, L. A. 2011. Ostrom’s Law: ‘Property Rights in the Commons. 
International Journal of the Commons 5(1):9–27.
Flyn, D. 2012. Crofting Law: ‘The Law of a Different land’. In Scottish Life and 
Society: The Law. A Compendium of Scottish Ethnology, Vol. 13, ed. Mark A. 
Mulhearn, 418–435. Edinburgh: John Donald.
Forsyth, T. and C. Johnson. 2014. Elinor Ostrom’s Legacy: Governing the 
Commons, and the Rational Choice Controversy. Development and Change 
45(5):1093–1110.
Forsyth, T. and A. Walker. 2014. Hidden Alliances: Rethinking Environmentality 
and the Politics of Knowledge in Thailand’s Campaign for Community Forestry. 
Conservation and Society 12(4):408–417.
Foucault, M. 1983. The Subject and Power. In Michel Foucault: Beyond Structure 
and Hermeneutics (2nd ed.), eds. H. L. Dreyfus and P. Rabinow, 208–226. 
Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Goodare, J. 2004. The Government of Scotland, 1560–1625. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Haller, T. 2010. Disputing the Floodplains: Institutional Change and the Politics 
of Resource Management in African Floodplains. Leiden: Brill 
Haller, T. 2013. The Contested Floodplain. Institutional Change of the Commons 
in the Kafue Flats, Zambia. Lanham: Lexington, Rowman & Littlefield.
Homans, G. C. 1975 [1941]. English Villagers of the 13th Century. New York: 
Norton.
Houston, R. 2014. Peasant Petitions: Social Relations and Economic Life on 
Landed Estates, 1600–1850. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.
298 Iain MacKinnon
Hunter, J. 1976. The Making of the Crofting Community. Edinburgh: John Donald.
Hunter, J. 1991. The Claim of Crofting. Edinburgh: Mainstream.
Hunter, J. 2000. The Making of the Crofting Community (2nd ed.). Edinburgh: 
John Donald.
Hunter, J. 2010. Rural Affairs and Environment Committee. Crofting Reform 
(Scotland) Bill. Submission from Professor James Hunter. Scottish Parliament. 
Available on-line at: http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/s3/committees/rae/
bills/documents/JimHunterwrittensubmissionformatted.pdf (accessed 3rd 
August 2011).
Johnson, C. 2004. Uncommon Ground: The ‘Poverty of History’ in Common 
Property Discourse. Development and Change 35(3):407–433.
Johnson, C. and T. Forsyth. 2002. In the Eyes of the State: Negotiating a “Rights-
Based Approach” to Forest Conservation in Thailand. World Development 
30(9):1591–1605.
Johnston, C. N. 1912. Small Landholders (Scotland) Acts 1886–1911. Edinburgh: 
William Green and Sons.
MacCoinnich, A. 2008. Siol Torcail and their Lordship in the 16th Century. In 
Crossing the Minch – Exploring the Links between Skye and the Outer Hebrides. 
Callicvol: Islands Book Trust.
MacCuish, D. J. and D. Flyn. 1990. Crofting Law. Edinburgh: Butterworths/Law 
Society of Scotland.
MacDhòmhnaill, D. I. 1998. Chì Mi. The Gaelic Poetry of Donald John 
MacDonald, ed. B. Innes. Edinburgh: Birlinn.
Macdonald, N. and C. Maclean. 2014. The Great Book of Skye: from an Island 
to the World. People and Place on a Scottish Island. Portree: Great Book 
Publishing.
MacGregor, M. 2006. The Statutes of Iona. Text and Context. Innes Review 
57(2):111–181.
MacGregor, M. 2012. Civilising Gaelic Scotland: The Scottish Isles and the 
Stewart Empire. In The Plantation of Ulster: Ideology and Practice, eds. E. 
Ó Ciardha and M. Ó. Siochru, from the series ‘Studies in Early Modern Irish 
History’, 33–54. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Macinnes, A. 1996. Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart. East Lothian: 
Tuckwell.
MacInnes, J. 2006. Dùthchas nan Gaidheal – Collected Essays of John MacInnes, 
ed. M. Newton. Edinburgh: Birlinn.
MacKillop, A. 2000. More Fruitful than the Soil: Army, Empire and the Scottish 
Highlands 1715–1815. Edinburgh: Birlinn.
MacKinnon, I. 2017. Colonialism and the Highland Clearances. Northern 
Scotland 8:22–48.
Maclean, S. 1999. From Wood to Ridge. Edinburgh: Carcanet.
Macleod, A. No date given. The Crofters Union Movement in the Last 100 Years. 
Angus Macleod Archive. NRAS 4336/1/3/5.
MacPhail, I. M. M. 1989. The Crofters’ War. Stornoway: Acair.
‘Decommonising the mind’: historical impacts of British imperialism 299
Markus, T. A., P. Robinson, and F. A. Walker. 1995. The Shape of the City in 
Space and Stone. In Glasgow: Beginnings to 1830, eds. T. M. Devine and G. 
Jackson, 106–139. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
McQuillan, P. 2003. Native and Natural. Aspects of the Concepts of ‘Right’ and 
Freedom in Irish. Cork: Cork University Press.
Meek, D. 1995. Tuath is Tighearna [Tenants and Landlords]. An Anthology of 
Gaelic Poetry of Social and Political Protest from the Clearances to the Land 
Agitation (1800–1890). Glasgow: Scottish Gaelic Texts Society.
Nayak, P. K. and F. Berkes. 2011. Commonisation and Decommonisation: 
Understanding the Processes of Change in the Chilika Lagoon, India. 
Conservation and Society 9(2):132–145.
Netting, R. 1981. Balancing on an Alp: Ecological Change and Continuity in a 
Swiss Mountain Community. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Newton, M. 2009. Warriors of the Word – the World of the Scottish Highlanders. 
Edinburgh: Birlinn.
No Author Given. Telegram Sent from the Clarion of Skye to the Balelone Land 
Raiders, North Uist. Clarion of Skye. December 1952.
Osterhammel, J. 2005 [1997]. Colonialism – A Theoretical Overview. Princeton: 
Markus Wiener.
Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for 
Collective Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ostrom, E. 2009. A General Framework for Analyzing Sustainability of Social-
Ecological Systems. Science 325:419–422.
Parliamentary Papers XXXVI. 1884. Report of the Commissioners of Inquiry 
into the Condition of the Crofters and Cottars in the Highlands and Islands of 
Scotland Volume V. HMSO.
RCLSS [Report of the Committee on Land Settlement in Scotland]. 1928 [Cmd. 
3110].
Robertson, I. J. M. 2013. Landscapes of Protest in the Scottish Highlands after 
1914. The Later Highland Land Wars. Farnham: Ashgate.
Schlager, E. and E. Ostrom. 1992. Property Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: 
A Conceptual Analysis. Land Economics 68(3):249–262.
Scotsman. 1960. CROFTERS NEED “CLEAR LEAD”. Changes in tenure  system 
urged. ACT “GHASTLY ERROR”. November 2.
Sinclair, J. 1814a. General Report of the Agricultural State and Political 
Circumstances of Scotland Drawn up for the Consideration of the Board of 
Agriculture and Internal Improvement, Vol. I. Edinburgh: Abernethy and 
Walker.
Sinclair, J. 1814b. Appendix to General Report of the Agricultural State and 
Political Circumstances of Scotland Drawn up for the Consideration of the 
Board of Agriculture and Internal Improvement, Vol. II. Edinburgh: Abernethy 
and Walker.
Sinclair, J. 1837. Memoirs of the Life and Works of the Late Right Honourable Sir 
John Sinclair, Bart, Vol. I. London: Blackwood.
300 Iain MacKinnon
Skinner, Q. 2009. The Sovereign State: A Genealogy. In Sovereignty in Fragments: 
The Past, Present and Future of a Contested Concept, eds. Q. Skinner and H. 
Kalmo, 26–46. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Smith, A. 1904 [1776]. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of 
Nations. London: Methuen and Co, Ltd. [Available online at: http://www.econ-
lib.org/library/Smith/smWN.html (accessed 19th March 2017)].
Stornoway Gazette. 1967. CROFTERS TO PRESS FOR NEW LEGISLATION. 
August 19.
Stornoway Gazette. 1968. MEETINGS TO DISCUSS OWNER OCCUPATION. 
November 16.
The Agricultural Magazine. 1803. Shew of Prize Cattle. The Agricultural 
Magazine December 1803 9(58):386–391. London: Vaughan Griffiths.
Tully, J. 2008a. Public Philosophy in a New Key. Volume I: Democracy and Civic 
Freedom. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tully, J. 2008b. Public Philosophy in a New Key Volume 2: Imperialism and Civic 
Freedom. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
van Leeuwen, E. S. 2010. Urban-Rural Interactions. Towns as Focus Points in 
Rural Development. Heidelberg: Springer Verlag.
Wa Thiong’o, N. 1986. Decolonising the Mind. The Politics of African Literature. 
Oxford: James Currey.
Walker, N.  2008. The Reframing of Law’s Imperial Frame: A Comment on Tully. 
In Public Law and Politics: The Scope and Limits of Constitutionalism, eds. E. 
Christodoulidis and S. Tierney, 117–128. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing.
Weber, M. 2005. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. Edited, with an 
Introduction by H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. With a New Preface by Bryan 
S. Turner. London: Routledge.
WHFP [West Highland Free Press]. 2008. Call for joint committee on crofting. 
6th June 2008.
WHFP [West Highland Free Press]. 2010. MSPs’ help sought in croft bill strug-
gle. 21st May 2010.
Wilson, B. 2007. The Future for Crofting – The case for Crofting Tenure. Fourth 
Angus MacLeod Memorial Lecture 25th October 2007. Kershader: Islands 
Book Trust.
Wilson, B. 2012. Brian Wilson writes…. In West Highland Free Press 28th 
December 2012.
